The founding of the Federal Reserve System in 1914 led to a substantial change in the behavior of nominal interest rates.
In Section I we provide a brief historical overview of the introduction of the Federal Reserve System. Our emphasis in particular is on the prevailing view of the impact of the Fed prior to its beginning of operations. Such historical evidence is by its nature difficult to interpret and highly controvertible. Our reading of the historical record, however, is that observers during 1914 expected the Fed to effect a major change in the economic forces determining interest rates.
We document in Section II that a substantial change in the stochastic process of short-term interest rates did indeed occur. In the period from 1890 to 1910, short rates were quickly mean-reverting and highly seasonal.
By contrast, in the period from 1920 to 1933, short rates were much more persistent; indeed, they were close to a random walk. There is little doubt that there was a major change in the stochastic process generating interest rates.
In Section III we examine the relation between long-term (six-month) and short-term (three-month) interest rates. Since the long rate incorporates an expectation of a future short rate, a change in the stochastic process generating short rates should alter the relation between long and short rates. In other words, as Robert Lucas's (1976) critique suggests, the parameters of traditional term structure equations relating long rates to short rates (e.g., Franco Modigliani and Richard Sutch, 1966) should not remain invariant across regimes. In particular, since shocks to the short rate were less persistent in the 1890-1910 period than in the 1920-1933 period, the long rate should be less responsive to the short rate -3-in the earlier period. We find that the relation between six-month and three-month rates did in fact change in the way suggested by expectations-based theories of the term structure.
We examine in Section IV the timing of the change in regime. Using switching-regression techniques, we estimate that the most likely date for the change in the stochastic process of the short rate is between December 1914 and March 1915. This estimate, which uses only interest rate data, coincides almost exactly with the date at which the Federal Reserve began operation. We consider the possibility that the change in regime was gradual, but find instead that it occurred essentially all at once.
In Section V we study how quickly financial market participants perceived the change in regime. Our inferences are based on the premise that long-term interest rates depend on individuals' perception of the stochastic process the short rate is following. If there was a substantial lag in individuals' recognition of the change in their environment, then the relation between long rates and short rates should have changed long after the change in regime itself took place. By contrast, we find that the change in the relation between the six-month rate and the three-month rate roughly coincided with the change in regime. This finding suggests that financial market participants quickly understood the stochastic processes generated by the new policy regime and that, at least for this historical episode, the convergence to the new rational expectations equilibrium was quite rapid.
We conclude in Section VI. The evidence from the founding of the Fed suggests that a major change in a policy regime, backed with the establishment of new and powerful institutions, can be understood very quickly by financial market participants. It would of course be imprudent to extrapolate directly this single historical episode to the evaluation of other sorts of policy proposals. This episode does illustrate, however, the potential for rapid adjustment of agents' expectations in the face of substantial and widely believed changes in the continuing policy rule.
I. Historical Overview
The year 1914 witnessed two crucial events in the world of finance:1 the creation of an important new institution, the Federal Reserve System, and the elimination of an old one, the classical Gold Standard.2 In the sections that follow, we provide econometric evidence that there was a substantial change in regime and that this change was understood by financial market participants at the time. Our goal in this section is to show that such a conclusion is historically plausible; indeed, it is suggested by the literature of the time. After describing briefly the events surrounding the passage of the Federal Reserve Act and the opening of the Reserve Banks, we show that the relevant economic actors were aware that a regime change was taking place and had a rough idea of how the new regime would differ from the old.
The proximate cause of the founding of the Fed was the financial panic of 1907, which severely disrupted the economy and was widely blamed for the 1907-1908 recession. In 1908, Congress passed the Aldrich-Vreeland Act, the most important result of which was creation of the National It is hard to believe that any change of regime was more widely perceived than the founding of the Federal Reserve.
Paul Warburg, a The opening of these banks marks a new era in the history of business and finance in this country. It is believed that they will put an end to the annual anxiety from which the country has suffered for the last generation about insufficient money and credit to move the crops each year, and will give such stability to the banking business that extreme fluctuations in interest rates and available credits which have characterized banking in the past will be destroyed permanently. 5
The financial press also believed that the introduction of the Fed would initiate an "elastic" currency and credit system.6 No longer would interest rates have to move over such a great range to match the supply and demand nr
The evidence -indicates strongly that financial market participants understood the intentions of the new institution. What we are unable to extract from the histor-ical record is whether businessmen at the time of the Fed's founding expected it to accomplish its assigned tasks, or alternatively, how long they expected the Fed would take to reach full operation. We can determine, however, that within a year of the opening of the Fed, popular opinion was that, as far as stabilization of the credit market was concerned, the Fed had accomplished all that it had set out to do. "What has thus far been done has been effectual in rendering stable and more uniform rates of discount prevalent throughout the country," wrote "Washington Notes" in the Journal of Political Economy.7 On the subject of whether the Fed was wholly responsible for the year of ease in the credit markets that had followed its founding, The Times wrote:
Few will contend that the favorable progress of the year is altogether due to the betterment of the conditions of banking and of commercial credit through the operation of the Reserve system. Fewer still will contend that the system did not reenforce the forces making for recovery in ways that hardly anybody foresaw. No doubt the extremely easy money market assisted, but the money market would hardly have been so easy without the certainty that there would be no currency-scarcity under the Federal system.8
II. The Stochastic Process of the Short Rate
The historical evidence presented above suggests that the behavior of short-term interest rates was a key feature of the change in regime associated with the founding of the Federal Reserve System. It is therefore natural to focus on this variable when studying the transition from the old regime to the new one.9 The interest rate series that we examine here is the three-month time loan rate available at New York City banks for the first week of each month during the period from 1890 to 1933.10 New York was already the major financial center of the country at this time. As John James (1978, pp. 61-64) reports, most loans in bank portfolios were short-term and most loans in New York were fixed maturity. We are thus examining here the rates on an important form of short-term commercial credit. Since there was no significant Treasury bill market until the early 1930s, it is one of the principal short-term rates in the economy. Table 1 shows the autocorrelations of the short rate during two different sample periods.11 The first ends clearly before the changes that led to the new regime, while the second begins several years after the changes had occurred (as well as after the end of World War I). We present the autocorrelations for both the level of the rate and its first difference.
The standard deviation of the short rate, both in levels and first differences, is provided at the bottom of the table.
-8-For the 1891-1910 period, the first autocorrelation of the level of the short rate is 0.75, and the autocorrelations die out fairly quickly. Seven out of the first eight autocorrelations of the change in the short rate are negative, indicating that the short rate was at least partly mean-reverting.
For the 1921-1933 period, the first autocorrelation of the level is close to one and the autocorrelations die out very slowly. All the autocorrelations of the change in the short rate are small for this later period.
The regression results in Table 2 confirm the impressions given by Table 1 . We show, for the two sample periods, regressions of the short rate on its own lagged value, including and excluding seasonal dummies. In the earlier period, the coefficient on the lagged short rate is significantly less than one, again indicating that the short rate was mean-reverting. Also, the seasonal dummies enter strongly significantly in the first period.12 In the later period, the coefficient on the lagged short rate is close to one and the seasonal dummy variables do not enter significantly, suggesting that the short rate is close to a random walk. These results demonstrate that the process for the short rate was very different after the founding of the Federal Friedman, 1984) .
Expectations-based theories of the term structure relate the long-term rate to current and expected future short-term rates. With monthly data, (1 + p3) rt +
The standard expectations theory of the term structure, which is the hypothesis that the term premium is constant, thus implies a restriction across equations (1) and (3). In particular, it implies that
The more persistent are shocks to the short rate (higher p), the greater is the response of the long rate to the short rate (higher ).
If the term premium 8 is constant through time, as the expectations theory assumes, then equation (4) has no error. More generally, however, if the term premium varies but is uncorrelated with the short rate, then equation (4) has an error but this error does not change the restriction in equation (5). Since the restriction in equation (5) is much more general than the expectations theory, the abundant evidence against the expectations theory (e.g., Robert Shiller, John Campbell, and Kermit Schoenholtz, 1982; Gregory Mankiw and Jeffrey Miron, 1985) is not directly relevant to this restriction.
Once one interprets the error in the Modigliani-Sutch equation
as the term premium, however, there is no reason to suppose it is serially uncorrelated. Below we quasi-difference equation (1) to correct for serial correlation. As long as the term premium is uncorrelated with the short -11-rate at leads and lags, the restriction in equation (5) continues to hold.
We can now see the implications of a change in the stochastic process generating the short rate. Since the dynamic process of the short rate Evidence Tables 3 and 4 present estimates of equation (1) for the two sample periods considered in Section II. In Table 3 we use the level of long and short rates, while in Table 4 we use quasi-differenced data in order to account for serial correlation. The filter we use is (1 -0.5 L), which is suggested by the Durbin-Watson statistic of the regression in levels and appears to leave the residual approximately serially uncorrelated. The coefficient estimates we obtain with quasi-differenced data are not qualitatively very different from those we obtain with the raw data. We hereafter restrict our attention to the results with quasi-differenced data.
These results show clearly the effects of regime changes predicted by
Lucas. In particular, the relation between long rates and short rates changed when the process for short rates changed in the way that the expectations theory predicts. The coefficient in the Modigliani-Sutch regression increased from 0.47 to 0.93 between the two periods. At least -12-by the time period covered in our second sample, agents had come to understand that a new, more persistent, process for the short rate was in effect, and they had altered their behavior accordingly.14 The results, however, are not completely consistent with the simple theory discussed above. While the sort of parameter drift observed is in line with that predicted by theory, the point estimates of the coefficient -in the Modigliani-Sutch equation are somewhat different than predicted. The short rate equation in Table 2 Table 4 and those implied by Table 2 This statistical rejection of the cross-equation restriction appears attributable to the assumption that the term premium is uncorrelated with the short-term interest rate. To illustrate directly the covariation between the term premium and the short rate, we can regress the excess holding return on long bonds, (Rt -0.5(rt + rt+3)), on the short rate, rt, Hence, covariation between the term premium and the short rate appears to account for the statistical rejection in the early period.16 While this covariation invalidates the cross-equation restriction in equation (5), a more persistent short rate (higher p) nonetheless leads, ceteris paribus, to a more responsive long rate (higher ). It is in this weaker sense that the evidence is consistent with the theory presented above.
IV. The Timing of the Change in Regime
In this section we try to pin down the timing of the change in the stochastic process for the three-month interest rate. We begin by determining the most likely date for the change in regime, conditional on the assumption that the change occurred all at once. We then consider the possibility that the change in regime occurred gradually over time.
Step Switching Suppose that the process for the short rate obeyed rt+l = K0 + p0 rt + vt.,
where T5 is the switch date (the first period of the new regime). Our goal is to estimate T5. The procedure we use is the maximum likelihood procedure suggested by Stephen Goldfeld and Richard Quandt (1976) and recently applied by John Huizinga and Frederic Mishkin (1985) to the -14-stochastic process followed by real interest rates. Assuming normal errors, the log likelihood function for this model is log L = -log(2ir) while the parameters for this process change as
All the parameters of the short rate process adjust continuously together.
The parameters a and a determine when the regime change occurs. In particular, at t = -a/ô, L(t) = 1/2 and the logistic curve has its inflection. At this date, the short rate process is an equal mix of the old and the new regimes. To judge the speed of the change in regime, define the dates t(1/4) and t(3/4) implicitly as
Then t(3/4) -t(1/4) is the period of time it takes for the parameters to make one half of the adjustment (from one-fourth new regime to three-fourths new regime). Straightforward algebra shows that
Hence, the parameter S is inversely related to the rate of adjustment between regimes. The limit of the logistic curve (6 -oo) is the step function, so this time-varying parameter model includes our earlier model as an extreme case. Table 7 presents results for the logistic time-varying parameter specification of the short rate process. The parameters are estimated with maximum likelihood assuming normal errors; see Goldfeld and Quandt.
We estimate the short rate process both excluding and including month dummies. To reduce the computational problem, when month dummies are included, their coefficients are set equal to the values estimated for the old and new regimes as presented in Table 2 .
Since the rate of adjustment is the key parameter here, we present the results for various rates of adjustment, choosing the remaining -18-parameters to maximize the likelihood function. For each rate of adjustment, we present the maximum likelihood switch date (L(T5) = 1/2), the maximum likelihood value achievable with that rate of adjustment, and the posterior odds ratio for that rate of adjustment relative to the maximum likelihood rate of adjustment.
The results in Table 7 indicate that either the step function (8 = co) or a very steep logistic curve has the highest likelihood value. Since the implied switch dates for these curves are in the first few months of 1915, these steep logistic curves closely approximate the step function considered above. The likelihoods of less steep logistic curves, however, are much lower. We can conclude with a high degree of confidence that most of the change in regime occurred in less than one year.
V. Learning About the Change in Regime
In Section III we demonstrated that, at least after a period of several years, agents had correctly responded to the new stochastic process for the short rate. Here we estimate how quickly this response occurred. As in our treatment of the short rate process, we examine both step switching and logistic switching.
The relationship between long rates and short rates depends on agents1 perception of their environment. Suppose, for example, that even after the stochastic process for the short rate had changed to the more persistent process, agents had believed that the old mean-reverting process for the short rate was still in effect. (Such a situation might arise if agents had -19-applied standard regression techniques to recent data to estimate the short rate process.) In this case, fluctuations in the short rate would have been perceived as more transitory than they truly were. The long rate, which depends on the expected short rate, would have responded to the short rate as under the old regime. In other words, if perceptions adjusted gradually to the new regime, then the change in the empirical relationship between long and short rates should lag the change in the short rate process.
Step Switching 
VI. Conclusion
The picture that emerges from this study is that of a remarkably fast adjustment of expectations and behavior in the face of a major change in the economic policy regime. We of course cannot determine exactly the timing and rate of adjustment to the new regime. Nonetheless, it would be difficult to reconcile these data with the hypothesis that agents observed the new regime for many months before responding to it.
Several caveats are in order. First, by looking only at term structure data, we are able to examine only the expectations of a relatively small group: New York financiers and businessmen who participated in the time loan market. Indeed, it may not even be necessary that all members of this group held the correct expectation right away; arbitrage by a well-informed subset might have produced the results we find. One should be cautious in applying our findings to situations in which the relevant expectations are those of a larger or less sophisticated group of economic actors.
Second, the implications of the regime change that we study, at least for short-term credit markets, were not difficult to predict. Since interest rate stability was one of the announced targets of Fed policy, no one should have been surprised that the stochastic process of short rates did in fact change. In many other cases of regime changes, the crucial expectations are those of non-target variables. In these cases, the relevant economic actors must have an implicit or explicit model of the economy, which complicates their problem of understanding the new regime.
Finally, we note that observers in 1914 could have had a high degree of -22- confidence that the Federal Reserve System would function as had been announced in advance. There was only modest political opposition to the new institution and no apparent benefits to the Fed in not fulfilling the expectations it had created. Our study does not speak directly to the problem of achieving credibility for an optimal but time-inconsistent policy.
The primary implication of all these caveats is that many particular circumstances facilitated the rapid adjustment of expectations to the regime change studied here. We therefore cannot be certain whether this phenomenon is to be found more generally. But the creation of the Federal Reserve does illustrate the surprising speed with which financial market participants can at times respond to a major change in the economic policy regime. to 25 basis points in size. We use the midpoint of the range. Tables Al and   A2 report all the data used. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Note: log L is the log of the likelihood function. The posterior odds ratio is the probability that the switch occured at that date relative to the probability that the switch occured at the date with the highest likelihood; this calculation is based on the estimated likelihood value and diffuse priors. Note: log L is the log of the likelihood function for the set of parameters that maximizes the likelihood for the value of 6. The posterior odds ratio is the probability that that value of c5 relative to the probability that the value of 5 with the highest likelihood; this calculation is based on the estimated likelihood value and diffuse priors. Ibid, page 1. Our focus here on the nominal short rate and the term structure of nominal interest rates is not meant to imply that real interest rates are unimportant. The expectations theory implies a change in the relation betheen long and short nominal rates even if, as Robert Shiller (1980) suggests, the stochastic process for real rates did not change.
-37-10. This data set is described in the Data Appendix and is examined in Mankiw and Miron (1986a) .
11. We end the second sample in 1933 because in that year the Glass-Steagall act introduced a variety of banking regulations. The results would be
essentially the same if we ended the second period before the beginning of the Great Depression in 1929.
12. The seasonal fluctuations in interest rates, which are not of primary importance for the issues we address in this paper, are discussed in Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz (1963, pp. 292-296) , Shiller (1980 ), Miron (1986 , Clark (1986) , and Mankiw and Miron (1986b) .
13. The assumption implicit here is that individuals have no information in forecasting the short rate other than the variables included in this equation. This assumption is obviously a strong one and can only be justified as an approximation. One test is to include the long rate in the forecasting equation, since the long rate would reflect any additional information on the future short rate. For the 1890-1910 period, the long rate coefficient is statistically significant but the improvement in fit is very small: the standard error of estimate falls by only .027 (2.7 basis points) .
For the 1920-1933 period, the long rate coefficient is not statistically significant. Hence, the assumption that agents have little information additional to that in our posited forecasting equation appears empirically plausible.
-38-14. Stanley Fischer (1983) writes, "It is indeed remarkable that the Lucas policy evaluation critique has triumphed without any detailed empirical support beyond Lucas's assertion that macroeconometric models in the 1960s all predicted too little inflation in the 1970s. The general point made by the cr-itique is correct and was known before it was so eloquently and forcefully propounded by Lucas. That the point has been empirically relevant, however, is something that should have been demonstrated rather than asserted." The evidence from the founding of the Fed provides such a demonstration.
15. Under the assumption that the error in the Mod-igliani-Sutch equation is the term premium and independent of the error in the short rate equation, the joint log likelihood is the sum of the two individual log likelihoods. We maximize the joint log likelihood by numerical optimization. We do not impose here cross-equation restrictions on the month dummies, which allows for the possibility of a seasonal term premium.
16. Measurement error in the short rate is observationally equivalent to a negative covariation between the term premium and the short rate. While there is clearly some measurement error in these data, since the interest rates are the midpoint of a reported range of typically 12.5-25 basis points, we suspect that the measurement error is not sufficiently great to explain the results reported in the text.
17. We have searched over all possible switch dates 1890-1933, but only report values around the global maximum. Since the coefficient estimates are essentially the same as those in Table 2 , we do not report them here. 21. The coefficient estimates are essentially the same as those in Table 4. 22. We again reduce the computational problem by using the estimates in Table 4 for the month dummies.
